Efectos Unilaterales de las Fusiones Horizontales y Estructura Industrial Bancaria (Perú, 2000-2019)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.35588/x5n38p93Palabras clave:
Fusiones horizontales, Fusiones unilaterales, Poder de mercado, Concentración industrial, Sistema bancarioResumen
Desde la perspectiva de la Organización Industrial, se estudian los efectos unilaterales de las fusiones horizontales y su relación con la estructura industrial bancaria en Perú. La teoría y la política de competencia sobre la materia, condensada en las legislaciones antimonopolio de Estados Unidos y Europa, han inspirado la legislación sobre control previo de las concentraciones empresariales en Perú (Ley N°31.112 de 2021). Al aplicarse al mercado bancario, jerarquizado en bancos líderes y seguidores y haciendo uso de un modelo de datos de panel para el período 2000-2019, se destacan hallazgos estadística y teóricamente aceptables sobre la significación del poder de mercado, los costos relativos y las fusiones horizontales en la estructura industrial bancaria de este país.
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